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COMMERCIALPOLICIES
OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The assessment of market potentials concluding Chapter 4 may be too
optimistic. How far the expansionary forces go depends heavily on the
commercial policies of the developed countries with regard to imports
of. manufactures from less developed countries. It remains therefore to
consider in this regard both the tariff structures of the developed coun-
tries and nontariff barriers which, in some cases, may have a far more
restrictive effect.
Tariff Structures:
Nominal Versus Effective Rates
Table 17 offers a summary analysis of trade in four main product
groups, imports in each group being broken down according to stage
of manufacture. The selection of products is limited to those in which
the raw materials, as well as manufactures, lend themselves to inter-
national trade, thus omitting items such as pottery and structural clay
products.' They are limited also to those in which, on the criteria de-
veloped in this study, the manufacturing process is relatively labor-
intensive, leaving out petroleum, aluminum, and steel, for instance.2 The
product groups included in the table thus seem to offer a choice as
1Similarly,there would to be little point in comparing imports of seafood,
fruit, and vegetables in fresh and in processed or canned form, given the rather
different varieties involved at each stage.
2Ananalysis by the FAO of trade in vegetable oils and materials, to take
another example, notes several factors favoring location of the crushing industries
in the importing countries, including not only the very low value added (tenta-
tively assumed to be only about 15 per cent) and the capital-intensive nature
of the operation but also the advantages in blending materials from a variety of
("Trade in Processed Agricultural Commodities," Proceedings of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Vol. IV, Trade in




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4118 Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
Notes to Table 17
Source: Compiled from statistical, publications of the United Na-
tions.
Note: I =crudematerials, IIintermediate products, III =finished
manufactures.
almports of countries reporting on a c.i.f. basis have been adjusted
to an approximate f.o.b. basis by use of differentials given in Tariff
Commission's release of February 7,1967, "C.I.F. Value of U.S.
Imports."
bSweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria.
°France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg.
dlncludes also shoes of materials other than leather.
to where manufacturing occurs along with a presumption that compara-
tive advantage is on the side of the less developed countries.
The distinction by stage of manufacture in Table 17 is made in light
of the standing complaint of less developed countries that the import
tariffs of the developed countries tend to be graduated according to
stage of manufacture so as to bear lightly, if at all, on imports of raw
materials for use in manufacture and to penalize imports of processed or
finished goods. To the extent that these influences prevailed, many of
the less developed countries would have to remain hewers of wood and
drawers of water.
Theoretical and empirical support for the view that the "escalated
tariff structures" of the advanced countries are "a potentially powerful
inhibitor of economic growth in the underdeveloped countries" has been
developed by Harry G. Johnson, Bela Balassa, Giorgio Basevi, W. M.
Corden, and others.3 Their analyses make the point that nominal tariffs
may be quite different from effective tariffs, the latter being related to
value added by manufacture after taking account of duties paid on ma-
terial inputs. When the rates specified in the tariffs are graduated ac-
cordiiig to stage of manufacture, the effective rates are higher, and
frequently much higher, than the nominal rates.
Suppose, for example, that an import consignment of cotton cloth
worth $500 is subject to an import duty of $100. Suppose further that
8SeeHarry G. Johnson, "The Theory of Tariff Structure, with Special Refer-
ence to World Trade and Development," in Johnson and Peter B. Kenen, Trade
and Development, Geneva, 1965, pp. 9—29 (quotation from page 23); Bela
Balassa, "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation," Journal of
Political Economy, December 1965, pp. 573—594; Giorgio Basevi, "The United
States Tariff Structure: Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection of United States
Industries and Industrial Labor," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1966,
pp. 147—160; W. M. Corden, "The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective
Protective Rate," Journal of Political Economy, June 1966.Commercial Policies of Developed Countries 119
the same amount and quality of cloth produced at home would require
$240 of yarn which, if imported, would bear a duty of $30. In this case
the value added by weaving is $260, protected by a duty of The
effective rate of duty, computed in relation to value added, is there-
fore 26.9 per cent as contrasted with the nominal rate of 20 per cent.
Moreover, it may be more meaningful to relate the duty only to the
wage part of value added on the assumption that capital costs are not
likely to be lower, and may. well be higher, in less developed than in
developed countries. On this basis, and assuming that payroll makes up
60 per cent of value added in the example chosen, the effective rate of
protection would be about 45 per cent. This would be the amount by
which labor costs per unit of output in the importing country could
exceed those in the exporting country. The difference will be greater still
to the extent that capital costs, transportation charges, and other costs
work in favor of the importing country. (And, of course, the difference.
in earnings per worker will be much greater still when the difference in
productivity of labor is as large as it typically is between less developed
and developed countries.)
Table 18, drawn from a current study by Balassa, presents nominal
tariff rates and estimates of the effective rates, on both of the bases just
described, for most of the intermediate products and finished manu-
factures covered by Table These estimates necessarily involve an
element of approximation regarding input coefficients and can perhaps
best be regarded as illustrative rather than as precise measurements.
In most cases the effective rates are much higher than nominal tariffs.
Some extreme examples are wool yarn and wool fabrics in the United
States, products of coarse fibers in .the Common Market, and plywood
in both. Precisely because of the high protection of wool yarn and
fabrics in the United States, however, the estimated effective rate in this
country on imports of wool clothing becomes negative. The effective
rates in Japan are in most instances higher than in the United States
or the Common Market. In the United Kingdom, the structure of protec-
It is relevant to the history of economic doctrine to note that this example
is drawn from a study of tariff protection and free trade published more than
sixty years ago by the Austrian economist and former undersecretary of state
Richard Schüller (Schutzzoll and. Freihandel, Vienna and Leipzig, 1905). Dr.
Schüller's concise presentation on pages 149—150 of his study contains the funda-
mentals of what is now being developed into a theory of tariff structures.
5Table18 does not show crude materials, most of which are admitted duty-
free by the industrially developed countries (thus contributing to the graduation
of duties by stage of manufacture). The United States, as a major producer as
well as consumer of crude materials, is something of an exception, duties being
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Notes to Table 18
Source: Bela Balassa, "The Structure of Protection in the Indus-
trial Countries and. Its Effect on the Exports of Processed Goods from
DevelopingNations,"UnitedNationsConference onTrade and
Development, May 25, 1967 (TD/B/C.2/36).
.Note:Rates relate tostructure prior to completion of Kennedy
Round of GATT negotiations..
aTbe estimated effective rate on value added by labor is the lower
of two sets of estimates given by Balassa (the higher estimates allow-
ing for higher capital costs in developing countries).
bData relate to selected components of SITC No. 841.
tion is not very different from that of other developed countries as far
as tariff rates imposed on imports from outside the Commonwealth are
concerned. These rates are, however, of less relevance than those of
other countries (and are accordingly omitted from Table 18), since im-
ports from the Commonwealth, including such major suppliers as Hong
Kong and India, are generally free of duty (though not necessarily
free of other restraints, as in cotton textiles and jute products).
It is noteworthy that, though the United States tariff appears in gen-
era! to be no less graduated or escalated than those of other countries
and is sometimes held to be more so, the effect on the structure of its
imports as reflected in Table 17 seems to be much less marked than in
some other developed countries, especially some of the members of the
Common Market and Japan. One important reason is that the United
States is itself a major producer and exporter of some of the crude
materials included in the table,notably, cotton,cattle hides, and
hardwoods. This alone would tend to cause a higher ratio of manufac-
tured to unmanufactured imports than would be true of most other
developed countries. The same influence may affect the composition of
imports by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
Nevertheless, imports of finished manufactures from less developed
countries by most countries of Western Continental Europe look very
small, and those of Japan altogether trivial, compared both with their
own imports of crude materials and intermediate products and with im-
ports of finished goods by the United States from less developed coun-
tries. Part of the explanation may be that, even if effective tariff rates
in the United States are the same as in Europe or Japan, they may be
less effective, in fact, in restricting imports of labor-intensive goods,
if wage costs per unit of output in manufacturing these goods are higher
here than in other developed countries.122 imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
Nontariff Barriers to Imports
There are, however, other more specific though sometimes less visible
hindrances to the growth of the trade than those presented by tariffs.
The most obvious, at least so far as they are reported, are quantitative
restrictions. After taking note of some further, but slow, progress in
removing these restrictions, a mid-1966 report by UNCTAD observes
that "the area of exports still affected is considerable and includes a
number of products of major export interest to developing countries."
The report then summarizes the position as follows: "Out of 63 Brus-
sels Tariff Nomenclature items of export interest to developing coun-
tries, quantitative restrictions on the following among them are still
maintained in the developed countries, namely: France 56, Japan 24,
Federal Republic of Germany 21, Denmark 15, Norway 14, Austria 13,
Italy 10, United Kingdom 7, Switzerland 6, Sweden 3, United States 3,
Netherlands 2, Belgium-Luxembourg 2, Canada 1."
It is hard to judge the significance of these restrictions, since they
may be nominal in some cases and rigorously enforced in others. It
is even more difficult to judge the incidence and effect of other more
subtle hindrances, such as administrative red tape or collusion among
private producers and distributors within the developed countries, but
the absence of trade is sometimes difficult to explain otherwise. Though
it is difficult to separate from other influences noted, perhaps something
should be allowed for the view that competition is keener in the United
States market than in other devcloped countries,7 and that American
entrepreneurs are more active in seeking out foreign sources of supply.8
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Review of Inter-
national Trade and Development, 1966," Summary of Report by the Secretary-
General, July 20, 1966 (TD/B/82), p. 15. A revised version of the material on
nontariff barriers, "cleared with the governments of the developed countries con-
cerned," was issued on May 29, 1967 The revised report covers
a much longer list (147 Brussels Tariff Nomenclature items) of "manufactures
and semimanufactures of export interest to developing countries," but does not
attempt to summarize the results in the manner of the earlier document cited
above.
This is, of course, a view that would be difficult to test empirically. Joe S.
Bain in his study, International Ditferences in industrial Structure (New Haven,
1966), finds "distinct differences in absolute sizes of principal manufacturing
plants" between the United States and all of the other seven countries studied
(United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, Canada, India, and Sweden) along with
"strong tentative indications that inferior plant sizes abroad seem to be associated
with the production of significantly larger shares of industry outputs in plants
ofinefficientlysmallscale"(p.143). As oneofseveral"verytentative
hypotheses," he suggests that in many of the foreign countries in question, "thereCommercial Policies of Developed Countries 123
Restraints on Imports of Cotton Textiles
The history of cotton textiles in recent years illustrates how the very
growth of trade can be its own undoing through provoking restrictive
measures by the, importing countries. Following the swift increase in
imports of cotton textiles from India, Hong Kong, and other Common-
wealth. sources in the 1950's,9 the United Kingdom made a series of
arefoundgenerally, and especially as nurtured in markets which are cartelized
or not very competitive, some inertia, lack of vigorous enterprise, lack of tech-
nological information (ignorance), dampened profit-seeking motivation, and a
social resistance to technological change" (p. 147).
8RichardL. Barovick reports in the Journal of Commerce, August 12, 1966,
that the large retailers in the United States "have become a major underpinning
for the high level of consumer goods imports," and that some of them "have
combed the world for the best combination of price, and quality." To illustrate,
he points out that Macy's maintains a network of fifteen full-time offices in
Europe and the Far East, and that the Hong Kong office alone employs a staff
of thirty-five to forty persons, "all of them engaged in developmental work."
See also the article by Bruce Hyatt, "Reaching the Department Store Market
in the United States: Guidelines for Developing Nations," in International Trade
Forum, December 1966, GATT, Geneva, pp. 10—13.
The rise in these imports is explained as follows by A. M. Alfred, the chief
economist for Courtaulds Ltd., in a paper read at the Manchester Statistical
Society on November 10, 1965 ("U.K. Textiles—A Growth Industry"):
"On the import side, you will know well that the U.K. textile industry, par-
ticularly the Cotton sector, has suffered from an unforeseen consequence of the
Imperial Preference Treaty negotiated at Ottawa in 1932. Under that treaty, it
was agreed that cotton and wool textiles and made-up goods could enter the
U.K. duty free if coming from the Commonwealth. At that time there was no
textile activity of relevance in India, Pakistan or Hong Kong. In fact India
(then undivided) imported 550 mn. yds. of cloth from the U.K. In 1964 the
U.K. imported 450 mn. sq.yds., of cloth and made-up goods from India,
Pakistan and Hong Kong—a reversal of a billion yards. This large volume arose
because of the channelling of these Commonwealth exports into the only country
into which they could come duty free."
After noting that these imports, together with imports from other under-
developed countries made up35 per cent of British consumption, compared with
his estimates of 8 per cent for the United States and 9 per cent for the European
Common Market, Mr. Alfred went on to speak of "the ridiculous state of affairs
whereby the U.K. cotton industry is the only industry in any developed country
of the world to have zero protection against a major supplier."
While recognizing that the "market disruption" in the British textile industry
has been far greater than in other developed countries, one cannot fail to detect
in this account a double standard frequently characteristic of attitudes in de-
veloped countries toward trade with the less developed countries: Free trade
in textiles within the Commonwealth seemed logical and desirable as long as the
flow was from the United Kingdom outward, but ceased to be so when the flow
reversed (though the initial impact of British factory-produced textiles on the
Indian handicraft industry in the nineteenth century had been no less disruptive
than that more recently experienced inthe United Kingdom when the tide
turned).124 Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
bilateral agreements aimed at limiting the further growth of the trade.
The United States, after a rapid rise in imports from some of 'these
countries and from Japan, took the lead in negotiating in 1961 a short-
term and then, in 1962, a long-term international cotton textile "ar-
rangement," under which it has made numerous bilateral agreements for
"voluntary restraints" by the exporters. Continental European countries
were happy to join in the arrangement, with the blessing it confers
on avoidance of "market disruption," but for the greater part have
continued to prove willing and able to apply their own import restraints.
These restraints are sometimes more than meet the eye. The director-
general of GATT, in opening the "major review" caLled for in the ar-
rangement at the end of the third year, noted that "all trade restrictions
on cotton textiles are not fully notified by participating governments"
and urged them to "help lift the haze which still rests over this sub-
ject." 10
Despitethese open and hidden restrictions, imports of cotton textiles
by the developed countries from "Group II" countries (i.e., developing
exporting countries") have increased relatively fast. Those of Western
Continental European countries doubled from about $50 million in 1961
to something over $100 million in 1964. At that level, however, they
still fell short of imports from "Group II" countries by the United King-
dom (around $170 million) and by the United States ($126 million).
both o2 which had risen substantially as well."
Apart from the United Kingdom, these increases have all been from
extremely low levels compared with home consumption—so low in sev-
eral of the Western Continental European countries that, according to
Gardner Patterson, even their commitment to large percentage increases
under the five-year arrangement was regarded by some of the exporting
countries "as bordering on fraud." 12Inhis remarks quoted above open-
10Pressrelease GATF/946, December 8, 1965.
11Theseestimates (derived from Study on Cotton Textiles, GAIT, Geneva,
June 1966, Table VI) relate only to textiles, clothing, and other products of
cotton and, in some cases, are adjusted to exclude textiles of other fibers. In
addition, the figures for the United Kingdom and Western Continental European
countries are adjusted to an approximate f.o.b.basis. "Group II" in the text
includes Spain, Portugal, and Turkey in addition to various of the less developed
countries as defined here. As noted earlier in this chapter, the United Kingdom
tightened restraints in the latter part of 1964, resulting in a decline in its imports
of cotton textiles from the less developed countries, but those of the United
States and Western Continental Europe have continued to rise.
12GardnerPatterson,DiscriminationininternationalTrade: The Policy
Issues, 1945—1965, Princeton, 1966, p. 311. Patterson gives in Chapter VI an
illuminating account of the background and working of the international cotton
textile arrangement.Commercial Policies of Developed Countries 125
ing the "major review" of the arrangement, the director-general of
GATT expressed the hope that it had brought "some semblance of
order" into the trade through restraint actions, and that the parties
to the arrangement could begin to give effect to its "long-term and posi-
tive aims," including in particular expanded access to markets for the
less developed countries.
It remains to see how much emphasis will be given to these long-run
objectives during the further three-year period, starting October 1, 1967,
for which the cotton textile arrangement has been extended. At least as
far as the United States is concerned, government officials reporting to
business groups on the renewal of the arrangement have stressed rather
the objective Of avoiding "market disruption," the expectation that the
rapid growth of U.S. imports of cotton textiles would be greatly slowed
down, the intention of acting to regulate imports from new suppliers,
and continued close cooperation with the industry through the Manage-
ment-Labor Textile Advisory Committee.13 In connection with the ex-
tension of the arrangement, stfess has also been placed on the limited
extent of the tariff cuts on textiles made by the United States and other
developed countries in the Kennedy Round.'4
Jute, Leather, and Wood Products
Among the other product groups covered by Table 17, the market
prospects for products of jute and other coarse fibers appear none too
favorable at best because of the inroads of synthetic fibers and new
methods of materials handling and packaging. Similar influences may
bear adversely on leather and leather products. Perhaps for these very
reasons one might expect growth-minded governments in the developed
countries to be willing to accord a larger place to manufactures of
Seeespecially the address by Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Resources, before the Underwear Institute in Atlantic City
on May 9,1967. The "close industry-government relationship" was sharply
criticized as "a dangerously intimate industry role in the administration of this
major international program" in the report of August 29, 1966, by Congressman
Curtis already cited in Chapter 3. He raised the "troublesome question
whether it is the policy of the U.S. cotton textile industry that the U.S. govern-
ment has for the last five years been implementing, rather than a policy repre-
sentative of the national interest."
14"Becauseof the import sensitivity of textiles in general here and abroad, the
cuts made by the U.S. and other major importing countries average less than
25percent and much less than that on the more sensitive product areas such as
woolen and man-made textiles. Many textile products were excluded altogether"
(Quoted from address by the then Acting Secretary of Commerce, Alexander
B.Trowbridge,atthe Alabama InternationalBusinessForum, Tuscaloosa,
May17, 1967).126 Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
these products by India and Pakistan, which are the main suppliers,
giving them an opportunity to increase their export earnings over the
amounts now received for the crude or semimanufactured materials.
Lower prices for the finished products might also be expected to help
strengthen the competitive position of these materials and to contribute
in this way also toward improving the export earnings of the suppliers.
Wood and wood products are of interest for rather the opposite rea-
sons. First, many of the less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America are large actual or potential exporters of tropical hard-
woods, which are the type principally involved in the trade at present,
and some of them are also capable of becoming mass producers of
coniferous wood for pulp and paper and other uses. Second, Western
Europe and Japan appear slated to become increasingly heavy importers
of tropical hardwoods. A study by the FAO for UNCTAD in 1964 15
placed their hardwood imports from less developed countries in 1959—
61 at an annual average of about $250 million, f.o.b., consisting over-
whelmingly of unprocessed timber. It projected an increase of approxi-
mately $1 billion, at 1959—6 1 prices, in these imports from the less
developed countries by 1975, ifall of Western Europe's additional
takings and "a reasonable proportion" of Japan's were fully processed
in the form of sawn wood, veneers, and plywood. But the increase would
be less than half that amount if, as at present, the imports were pre-
dominantly in the form of logs. The study stressed that these hardwood
imports would have to come from the less developed countries. It also
foresaw that Western Europe and Japan would have a growing deficit
in softwood, which could be met by the less developed countries to the
extent of $100 million in 1975 and in increasing amounts thereafter.16
A companion analysis underlying these projections found that there
were "good reasons to expect the production both of quality hardwood
plywood and veneer, and of the mass produced paper and paperboard
grades based essentially on long-fibre woodpulp, to become concen-
trated near their source of material." Among the reasons developed
See "Prospects for Expanding Forest Products Exports from Developing
Countries," in Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Vol. III, Commodity Trade, United Nations, 1964.
10 In addition, the FAO study projected that imports of tropical sawn wood and
plywood (SITC nos. 243 and 631) by the United States and Canada from the
less developed countries would rise from $50 million annually in 1959—61 to
$150 million in 1975 (a figure which now seems low by comparison with their
actual imports of $114 million in 1965); and that Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa would import some $130 million, and the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe $40 million, of hardwood from the less developed countries
in 1975.Commercial Policies of Developed Countries 127
for this view were the foflowing: "The 'creaming' of the forests of
West Africa to sustain an export trade in high-quality veneer logs of
a limited range of species is a much more costly and inefficient way
of drawing on these forests than to use them as a base for a balanced
range of forest industries designed for integral utilization, located in
that region. Quite apart from this, the shipping of wood products rather
than logs reduces the incidence of freight. Also, the extra stages of dry-
ing, shipping and 're-slushing' of wood pulp can add 10 tO 15 per cent
to the final cost of papers with a high wood-fibre content." The study
added, however, that "The earlier pattern of supply developed around
a series of tariffs which generally encouraged the import of roundwood
rather than wood products," and that "A freer flow of plywood and
veneer and of paper and paperboard would require a change in tariff
structures to remove this discrimination." 17Theinfinitesimal amount
of plywood and other wood manufactures imported by Western Con-
tinental Europe from less developed countries (Table 17) suggests,
however, that nontariff barriers may also be important.
In brief, the developed countries would seem to have it within their
power,by reducing the tariff and other barriers to imports of finished
manufactures, to influence greatly the export earnings of the less de-
veloped countries and therewith their possibilities of economic growth.
The Problem of Increased Access to Markets
The Issue of Preferences
The first condition for a continued rapid growth of exports of manu-
factures by the less developed countries to the advanced countries
would seem to be. greater accessibility to these markets. Greater ac-
cessibility would mean the scaling down of the tariff rates of developed
countries, particularly the "effective rates," on goods of which the less
developed countries are actual or potential suppliers; the progressive
loosening of quantitative restrictions, both those imposed by the im-
porting countries and the "voluntary restraints" exercised by the ex-
porting countries; and the identification and removal of other, less obvi-
ous impediments to imports. More broadly, greater accessibility would
mean recognition that international specialization has a place for the
products in which the less developed countries have a comparative ad-
vantage, and that this place will widen and deepen as the rise in
EuropeanTimber Trends and Prospects: A New Appraisal, 1950—1975, Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, New York, 1964, p. 212.128 Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
tivity and wages in the developed countries produces divergent effects
on unit wage costs in different industries.
The great debate in recent years on commercial policies affecting the
less developed countries, reaching a crescendo at the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development in 1964 and still continuing, has turned
increasingly on the issue of tariff preferences; thatis, whether the
enlargement of market opportunities for the less developed countries
should be sought within the most-favored-nation framework embodied
in the GATT, whereby the concessions made would be generalized and
extended also to developed countries, or whether the less developed coun-
tries should be accorded preferential treatment in recognition of their
difficulties in competing with the developed countries.18 Rightly or
wrongly, the less developed countries seem to have become convinced
that only a system of preferences would meet their needs, though they
differ among themselves, as well as with the developed countries, as to
what the terms of the preferences should be. The United States, adher-
ing to the principle of nondiscrimination, has been in the invidious po-
sition of leading the opposition to these demands, sometimes to the
point of seeming to be the only voice in opposition.'9
After the vast exceptions to the most-favored-nation principle con-
stituted by the European Economic Community and the European Free
Trade Area, the idea of tariff preferences to favor the less developed
countries may appear to be a modest objective. It seems to accord ill,
however, with the realities of the present trading situation in which,
as the director-general of GATT has observed, "the tendency is, in
the sectors where the less developed countries are already competitive,
for the developed countries to discriminate against the export products
of these countries." 20 Unless the developed countries are ready to forgo
those features of their commercial policies which seem to fall with par-
ticular severity on exports of the less developed countries, what expec-
tation can there be of shifting all the way over to discrimination in their
favor?
The heart of the difficulty, as far as exports of labor-intensive manu-
18 For a much fuller account of the history of thisissue,see Patterson,
Discrimination in International Trade, especially Chapter VII.
19 Harry G. Johnson, though severely critical of the negative stance of the
United States and of its failure to develop a more positive and imaginative policy,
suggests that, to an important extent, the United States served as a scapegoat
for other countries, especially the European Common Market countries, which
avoided commitment by abstaining from voting while the United States carried
the burden of resistance. (Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries,
Washington, 1967, especially p. 39.)
20 Address in Bad Godesberg, Germany, October 27, 1966.Commercial Policies of Developed Countries 129
factures by the less developed countries are concerned, is that these
products tend to compete with those sectors in the developed countries
which are frequently the least prosperous and the most successful in
obtaining protection against imports. The problem is illustrated by one
of the provisions of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, namely,
that authorizing the President to negotiate tariffs down to zero on
groups of industrial products of which the United States and the Euro-
pean Common Market together accounted for 80 per cent or more of
world exports. This formula reflected an erroneous expectation that
the United Kingdom was abOut to become a member of the Common
Market (without which the 80 per cent level would be realized only
exceptionally) .Butit also had the important effect of excluding prod-
ucts, notably textiles, of which Japan and the less developed countries
were significant exporters. In other words, the United States was pre-
pared to consider reducing tariffs by as much as 100 per cent on prod-
ucts which, as President Kennedy said, "can be produced here or in
Europe more efficiently than anywhere else in the world," 21 but only
by half as much in principle (perhaps a good deal less in practice) on
products in which Japan and the less developed countries were most
competitive. This, however, is only a specific illustration of the general
tendency of U.S. tariffs to bear more heavily on labor-intensive manu-
factures than on other goods.22 It raises the question whether, even if
the most-favored-nation ruleisrigorously respected, unequal tariff
treatment of different products may not be tantamount to unequal treat-
ment of different countries.
The Prebisch Proposals
Awareness of these difficulties led Raül Prebisch, in his advance mes-
sage as secretary-general to UNCTAD in 1964, to envisage something
less than a fully generalized system of preferences.23 As he saw it,
developed countries could not be expected to give preferential treatment
to those industries in the less developed countries that were already
fully competitive in world markets, and each country granting prefer-
ences might therefore establish a reserve list of such products to be
excluded from preferences (but not, he stressed, from most-favored-na-
21 See Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1962, p. 236.
22 See Beatrice N. Vaccara, Employment and Output in Protected Manufacturing
Industries, Washington,1960, pp. 55—66, and David StaffordBall,"United
States Effective Tariffs and Labor's Share," Journal of Political Economy, April
1967, pp. 183—187.
28 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Vol. II, Policy Statements, 1964, pp. 35—40.130 Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
tion treatment under GATT). Prebisch's case for preferences was, as
he said, "a logical extension of the infant industry argument" 24 aimed
at enabling the less developed countries to become competitive in
manufactures that they could not now export. Both the duration of
the preferences (a minimum of ten years was suggested) and the margin
of preference should be great enough to provide adequate incentive
for the establishment of new export industries.
Prebisch considered it desirable, but not indispensable, that all de-
veloped countries participate in granting preferences. He hoped that
they would avoid the crippling complexities of a highly selective country-
by-product approach, but recognized that they might insist on an over-
all quota, and possibly quotas on particular categories, governing the
amount of goods to be imported preferentially.
As to the preference-receiving countries, Prebisch recognized that
it would not be easy to set any kind of cutoff point above which coun-
tries would not be eligible. Among those which were eligible, he felt
it necessary to distinguish between the "more advanced" and the "less
developed" among them, suggesting for the latter wider margins of pref-
erence. This might be reinforced by a special grant of quotas in their
behalf and perhaps even by preferential tariff treatment on items which
the developed countries had reserved from general preferences.
A ustralian Preference System
Despite vigorous effOrts by the less developed countries at UNCTAD
for a declaration of principle in favor of preferences, all that emerged
in the final act of the 1964 conference was a decision to set up a
committee to consider the best method of implementing such a system
and to discuss diflerences of views on the question of principle.25 The
topic seems destined to figure even more prominently in the debates of
24 Johnson (Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries, pp. 18 1—184)
notes various differences between the infant-industry argument and the tariff-
preference argument, among them being that the first envisages a social invest-
ment paid for by the consumers of the country in which the protected industry
is located, whereas the second envisages that the cost is borne by consumers
in developed countries for the benefit oflessdeveloped countries. Johnson
further suggests (p. 198) that many of the objections to preferences growing out
of adherence to foreign trade principles would disappear, if preferences were
looked upon as "essentially additional foreign aid." The key word here is addi-
tional, and the argument loses force to the extent that, if the case for preferences
were presented on this basis, cuts might be made in appropriations for aid in other
forms.
25 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
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the second conference scheduled for 1968. Meanwhile, the only specific
action by way of preferences favoring imports from the less developed
countries is that taken by Australia under a waiver from the most-
favored-nation rule approved by GATT in March 1966.26 Though
staunchly defended by Australia as a manifestation of its willingness to
help overcome the trade problems of the less developed countries and
as a lead to other developed countries wishing to apply similar meth-
ods, the Australian preferential system may also be taken as indicative
of the limitations and problems in this approach. Its main features may
be summed up as follows from materials made public at the time of
requesting the waiver from GATT: 27
1. Preferential duties, zero in some cases, were to be introduced in favor of
the less developed countries, comprehensively defined, on some sixty
items.
2. Each such concession was, however, subject to a quota limit, above which
regular duties would apply to imports from less developed countries.
3. These quotas added up to a total of £A6,680,000, or about $15,000,000,
representing in principle the amount of goods that might enter in a year's
time on a preferential basis.
4. More than 40 per cent of this total was made up of items which, it
would seem, were unlikely to provide the basis for any new export in-
dustries in less developed countries, at least in the near future. These
included, in particular, newsprint, £A2,000,000; machine-made paper
£A500,000; rubber thread, vulcanized, £A100,000; household wash-
ing machines, £A150,000; machine tools, £A150,000.
5. Other, generally more likely, items thus added up to £A3,780,000, or
about $8,500,000 in terms of amounts eligible for preferential treatment,
made up chiefly of consumer manufactures.28
6. More generally, it was indicated that the list was drawn up so as to omit
"products in which less developed countries are already competitive in
world markets," and that "the preferential rates should be subject to
modification as producers in less developed countries become competi-
tive."
28 According to the GATI'pressrelease of March 30, 1966 (GATF/953), the
contracting parties approved the request "by a substantial majority." Newspaper
reports at the time indicated that the .United States cast the only dissenting vote.
27 From statement and accompanying exhibits submitted by the Rt. Hon. J.
McEwen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry, to the
Australian House of Representatives on •May 19, 1965.
28 Actual imports of these goods from less developed countries in 1963—64
had amounted to £A1,300,000, or $2,900,000, some of which had entered under
Commonwealth preferential duties, leaving the effective net amount of additional
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7. On the other hand, it was also indicated that the items specified con-
stituted an "initial list" and that other products might be added from time
to time.29
Unless the Australian list were to be significantly expanded, it could
scarcely be said to open up major new export possibilities for the less
developed countries or to provide a challenging example for other
developed countries to follow. Indeed, the positive, effect of Australia's
action was at least partially offset by another step taken at the same
time whereby it informed GATT that, in accepting the new Part IV on
Trade and Development, it would not consider itself bound by the pro-
visions under which the developed countries undertook "to accord high
priority to the reduction and elimination of tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers to products of actual or potential export interest to less developed
countries" and "to refrain from increasing tariff and non-tariff barriers
against such products." 30
The "Brasseur Plan"
Except for the exclusion of Hong Kong from the benefits on certain
items, the Australian preferences are available toall less developed
countries, broadly defined. In this respect the Australian system appears
to be more generous than the "Brasseur Plan," with which it has been
compared, would be. This plan, named after the Belgian Minister of
Foreign Trade and Technical Assistance who made the proposals to
GATT in 1963, would entail negotiations.with individual less developed
countries to determine in each case the products to be covered, the
margin and duration of preference, and the quantities eligible to benefit.
If the plan were seriously looked upon as applying to most bilateral
relationships between developed and less developed countries and to
29 The list of goods specified in the annex accompanying the waiver voted by
GAIT on March 28,1966, included two additional groups called "various"
which were to be free of duty without quota limit. These appear to be mainly,
if not entirely, handicraft items. See the Fourteenth Supplement to the Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents, issued by the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, July 1966, pp. 23—31 and 162—
177. On the other hand, one item on the original list was omitted from the final
version, i.e., "matt-woven fabrics of jute, weighing more than 12 ozs. per sq. yd.,"
for which a duty-free quota of £A20,000 had been proposed, but with the
notation that India and Pakistan (the principal exporters of jute manufactures)
were to be excluded from the preference.
30 From Mr. McEwen's statement of May 19, 1965. Mr. McEwen denounced
these provisions as,a"blank check" and said that their effect would be "to
severely curtail our right to increase, or even to maintain, tariffs on any products
that might be designated—now or in the future—as being of actual or potential
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most items of interest in the trade, the amount of negotiation and speci-
fication required would be astronomical. Patterson suggests, however,
that "this approach had the great virtue to some members of the
European Economic Community that it would facilitate their safeguard-
ing the value of the existing preferences to each other and, more impor-
tant, to the Associated States."Itis not clear how valuable these
latter preferences are, in fact, to the Associated States—i.e., the former
African dependencies of France and Belgium—in view of the extremely
low level of their exports of manufactures to the former mother coun-
tries or other members of the European Economic Community.
Diverse Policies and Common Objectives
The effectiveness of tariff preferences in opening new markets for the
less developed countries cannot be judged in the abstract, but depends
on the terms of the preferences in each case. The measures adopted
in Australia and those contemplated under the Brasseur Plan are
not reassuring, however, if taken as a foretaste of the kind of prefer-
ential concessions to be expected. Rather, they give point to Prebisch's
warning that "it would not be worth facing all the political and other
difficulties entailed in a new departure from the most-favored-nation
principle simply for the sake of token margins of preference on a few
selected products for a very limited period, amounting to little more
in toto than a gesture in the face of the immense problems of the trade
gap." 32Hemight have added that, the more selective preferences are by
beneficiaries, the more fragmented is the bargaining power of the less
developed countries and the greater their economic dependence be-
comes on particular developed countries.
It is equally true that the gains to be achieved by the less developed
countries through the most-favored-nation approach cannot be judged
in the abstract. In principle, their bargaining position for obtaining
meaningful concessions from the developed countries is strengthened by
three considerations. First, the developed countries have, as noted,
pledged themselves in GATT as well as at UNCTAD to give "high pri-
ority" to the reduction of both tariff and nontariff barriers to the ex-
ports of the less developed countries. Second, the need of the less de-
veloped countries to increase exports to cover their growing import re-
quirements is widely recognized. Third, the gains from trade between
31.Discriminationin International Trade, p. 361.
32Proceedingsof the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
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countries with wide differences in factor endowments should be par-
ticularly large to both sides.
In fact, however, the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations seems
to have been regarded by the developed countries as primarily concerned
with trade relations among themselves,83 and it is by no means clear
what will follow to give effect to their commitments to the less developed
countries. As far as the United States is concerned, the tariff-cutting
authority vested in the executive branch by the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 does not extend beyond mid-1967, and proposals for a new trade
program remain to be formulated and approved. In the European Eco-
nomic Community there seems to be an increasing tendency to look on
the common external tariff as a condition for internal unification, while
the United Kingdom appears to be mainly concerned with joining the
EEC and perhaps more inclined to restrain than to stimulate its imports
from less developed countries, to judge by the uneven incidence noted
in Chapter 4 of the restrictions imposed in 1964 to bolster its balance of
payments.
Under these conditions, it may be difficult to develop and carry out
a common program of action by developed countries to remove barriers
to imports of manufactures from less developed countries, whether by
the preferential route or by the most-favored-nation approach. The
United States and other countries wishing to provide enlarged trade
opportunities to the less developed countries may therefore be faced
with the difficult choice, noted by Harry Johnson,84 between (1) uni-
laterally reducing tariffs on items of interest to these countries without
insisting on reciprocal concessions by developed countries benefiting
under the most-favored-nation principle, or (2) abandoning that prin-
ciple and granting concessions to the less developed countries only, or
to some of them, on a preferential basis compared with the tariff
treatment accorded imports from developed countries. The United
88 Gains for the less developed countries were particularly limited in textiles
and clothing, as noted above, both as the result of the adamant insistence of
the developed countries on renewal of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange-
ment, with its provision for "voluntary restraints" by the exporting countries, and
as the result of a last-minute decision, demanded by the EEC, to cut sharply
the extent of the tariff reductions made on textiles (a feature which could be-
come more consequential when the long-term cotton arrangement expires). It is
an open question, however, to what degree the less developed countries them-
selves were responsible for their failure to get more out of the Kennedy Round,
possibly because of inadequate representation during the long and many-sided
negotiations and possibly also because of a widespread tendency to think that
only preferential duty reductions would meet their needs.
84 Policies Toward Less Developed Countries, pp. 41 and 239.Commercial Policies of Developed Countries 135
States would thus have to abandon one of two basic principles—either
that of reciprocity or that of nondiscrimination.
Whatever the answer to this last question,35it seems likely that,
viewed as a whole, the trade policies of the developed countries vis-à-
vis the less developed countries will continue to be a mixed bag—equal
treatment in some sectors and areas and unequal treatment in others,
measures to expand trade along with restraints, declarations of good
intentions followed by good, bad, and indifferent results. One of the
weaknesses of the selective preferential approach in particular is that
it lends itself to illusions, by both preference-giving and preference-
receiving countries, as to how much has been accomplished. A great
amount of paper work may yield very little trade.
In the face of this prospective diversity and uncertainty, the question
arises whether it would be useful to try to make sure that the policies
pursued by the developed countries, whatever their form in each case,
were consistent with the results aimed at, which would involve quanti-
fying these aims with regard to the levels and rates of increase con-
templated for the trade. It may be recalled that Prebisch broached such
an idea in his advance report to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development in 1964, though it was only briefly considered,
with little support, at that meeting 36—that is, that targets be set for
An indication that the United States was willing to consider some modifica-
tion of its position against trade preferences was given in President Johnson's
statement at Punta del Este in April 1967: "We are ready to explore with other
industrialized countries—and with our own people—the of temporary
preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all
the industrialized countries." (See Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1967,
p. 709.) The key word in this formulation is no doubt all as applied to both
beneficiaries and givers of preferences.
The possibility of a more specific and immediate step, though a modest one,
was indicated in the statement issued on May 15, 1967, by the director-general
of GAIT in summing up the results of the Kennedy Round. Noting that the tariff
reductions agreed on in the negotiations would, in general, be phased over a
period of years, he said that the participants had, however, "recognized that, for
the developing countries, the immediate implementation of such tariff cuts would
be of great value in maximizing the benefits to them of these negotiations." He
further stated that efforts to achieve the advance application of the cuts to
imports from the developing countries would continue, and that a decision on
this point was expected to be reached by the time that the agreement embodying
the results of the Kennedy Round was ready for signature. GAiT press release,
May 17, 1967 (GATF/990). No such decision was announced at the time, how-
ever, and subsequent Congressional testimony by U.S. officials has indicated that
the issue was left for later consideration and that the United States had not taken
a firm position (The New York Times, July 13, 1967, p. 51).
For Prebisch,'s suggestions on this point, see pp. 38 and 60 of Vol. IIofthe
conference proceedings. In the form considered at the conference, this idea
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developed countries, collectively and individually, with respect to their
imports of manufactures from less developed countries.
Possible disadvantages of such a course are immediately obvious. If
the targets were set too low in relation to the potentialities of the trade,
they would be more of a hindrance than a help to its development. If
they were set too high, achievement of the targets could present em-
barrassment to private-enterprise economies.
Such problems may, however, be more theoretical than real in the
present instance. Reasons have been given in Chapter 4 for believing
that the forces underlying the rapid growth of the trade from the early
1950's to the mid-1960's may become progressively stronger. If that
view is correct, it would probably not be too much to suggest that, by
1975, the trade will again have grown fourfold or more to something
like $ [0 billion (at present prices). Higher figures could be envisaged
if the enlargement of market opportunities extended to all of the devel-
oped countries, including those that so far have lagged behind in
imports of manufactures from less developed countries.
Fulfillment of targets by the developed countries in these conditions
would not be a matter of creating artificial inducements but of remov-
ing artificial impediments to the trade. Some developed countries might
elect to do so by reducing import barriers over the whole range of
products of interest to less developed countries and to do so on a
most-favored-nation basis. Some others might choose to proceed much
more selectively with respect to both the products and the countries
benefiting by the concessions. Whatever the method, a set of agreed
targets should help to give a common purpose and meaningful content
to their actions.
It would doubtless require a good deal of study and negotiation
to obtain agreement on a global target for imports of manufactures from
the less developed countries that would be both consistent with their
growing foreign exchange needs and acceptable to the developed coun-
tries. Arriving at an agreed basis for distributing a global target among
individual importing countries could well prove even more
was that "Developed countries should cooperate with developing countries in
setting targets for the expansion of trade of the latter and in periodically review-
ing measures for their achievement." The United States and Canada voted against
the proposal, and the United Kingdom, Germany, and seven other developed
countries elected to abstain. Interestingly, France, Italy, and Belgium—all with
relatively small imports from the less-developed countries—voted in favor of
the proposal.
prebischsuggested that the total might be divided up (1) according to
each importing country's consumption of manufactures or (2) according to its
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A more modest and perhaps more realistic alternative would be for
each developed country simply to provide a quantitative analysis and
projection, by main groups of manufactures, of the expected evolu-
tion ofitsimports from less developed countries, taking account
of market trends and its own commercial policies. Such an under-
taking should at least serve to direct thinking about commercial policies
affecting less developed countries toward results as well as methods
and to make it more difficult to generate schemes lacking in effective
content.
It would no doubt be more difficult—but also more questionable—to
divide up a global import target, or even a set of projections, among
individual exporting countries. Too much depends on their own eco-
nomic situations and policies in each case. The Prebisch proposal
on preferences calling for gradation of preferential margins among
the less developed countries implies that the ability to export manu-
factures is positively correlated with their stage of economic develop-
ment. This must be true in some sense,if one thinks of potential
exports. But the analysis offered here has also revealed that, typically,
the "more advanced" of the less developed countries, including some
that have had preferentialaccess• tocertain developed countries'
markets, have not done well as exporters of manufactures to devel-
oped countries.If,asthis experience suggests, the basic difficulty
lies in their own economic situations and policies,it would be of
little advantage to them, and an unnecessary limitation on other less
developed countries' possibilities, to reserve for them specified shares
in a global import target. Even in such cases, however, a more receptive
attitude by developed countries toward imports from less developed
countries, along with quantitative assessments and projections of these
imports, would help to clarify the issues and to encourage policies in
the less developed countries conducive to the growth of their exports.
however, would tend to overstate, and the second to understate, import objectives
for large countries with diversified economies and less dependent on imports
than small countries with more specialized economies. Prebisch concluded that
a combination of the two criteria might yield a formula acceptable to all de-
veloped countries (p. 38 of Vol. II of the conference proceedings).